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Abstract- Security and privacy are one of the two primary 
concerns with RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) adoption. 
While the mainstream RFID research is focused on solving the 
privacy issues, this paper focuses on security issues in general and 
data tampering in particular. We specifically consider the issue of 
detecting data tampering on the RFID tags for applications such 
as data integrity management. To address this issue, we present a 
novel fragile watermarking scheme, which embeds a fragile 
watermark (or pattern) in the serial number partition of the 
RFID tag. This pattern is verified to identify whether or not the 
data on the RFID tags has been tampered with. The novelty of 
this watermarking scheme lies in the fact that we have applied 
watermarking technology to RFID tags; in comparison, most of 
the existing watermarking schemes are limited to images, or audio 
or video applications. We term this scheme TamDetect because it 
is a tamper detection solution. TamDetect is designed such that it 
can be easily plugged into existing RFID middleware applications. 
This proposal is one of the first works that integrates 
watermarking and RFID technologies together. This paper 




A RFID tag is an electronic device that holds identification 
data. Typically, the RFID tag is attached to items and contains 
a serial number, which is used to uniquely identify them. RFID 
technology uses radio waves to automatically identify items 
which have RFID tags attached to it.  
This new generation technology was initially developed with 
the aim to manage and track items, but is used in many other 
applications these days e.g. supply chain automation, asset 
tracking, medical applications, people tracking, manufacturing, 
retail and inventory tracking, livestock tracking and tracking 
exact timing in sports events. As pointed out by 
RFIDExchange “RFID applications are limited only by 
imagination” [19]. It can be used any where and every where if 
possible.  
RFID technology is composed of three main components; 
firstly, a RFID tag, which contains the identification number, 
secondly, a RFID Reader, which activates the tag to broadcast 
its identification number and finally, a RFID Middleware, 
which integrates the information from the reader to the 
backend database systems [16, 17]. This is shown in Fig. 1.  
However widespread adoption of RFID technology has been 
hindered because of several inherent issues that arise from its 
usage. The main issues are privacy, security, and cost, however 
deployment, scalability and resilience cannot be excluded from 
this list. Privacy is the main issue as far as the adoption is 
considered, whereas security is the main issue as far as 
implementation is considered.  
Since RFID tags can be used to track items and people it 
raises many privacy issues. If RFID is deployed in full scale it 
would raise several privacy concerns because RFID tags can be 
used to track consumer behavior, which can further be used to 
analyze consumer habits. It can be even be used for 
steganographic surveillance i.e. deploying secret RFID tags for 
tracking. With the size of RFID tags reducing day by day it has 
now become possible to hide them within products without the 
owners consent. E.g. Henning et al. (2005) pointed out that 
RFID tags are already been hidden in packaging [16]. A 
scenario of hidden RFID testing was discovered in a Wal-Mart 
store in Broken Arrow where secret RFID readers were kept to 
track customer action [19].  Using RFID technology could 
even trigger anti-social activities. Criminals with RFID readers 
could look for people carrying valuable items and can launch 
selective attacks [16].  However most of these issues can be 
tackled by privacy enforcement laws, which can be 
incorporated in the nation’s legal framework.  
Now considering the security aspect of RFID tags, it is worth 
noting that most of the Class 0 and Class 1 RFID tags are not 
capable of any secure communication. This is attributed to the 
fact that this class of RFID tags does not have enough 
computation power and storage capacity to perform any 
encrypted communication as a result all the data is transmitted 
in open which leaves doors open for eavesdroppers and 
attackers. For example Weis et al. (2004) estimate that as few 
as 500-5000 gates are employed in a typical RFID design, 
which are normally used for basic logic operation; hence there 
is no room for extras such as security [23]. In particular, 
symmetric encryption schemes such as Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) or hash functions such as Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA) or pseudo-random functions are not possible 
 
Fig. 1 RFID Architecture 
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on today's low end RFID tags. In addition to this the wireless 
nature of this communication architecture complicates this 
issue even further. Because the communication between reader 
and tag is wireless, it increases the possibility of eavesdropping 
by third parties. Considering this insecure communication, data 
tampering with the RFID tags cannot be ruled out and this is 
one of the most important security issues, which needs to be 
tackled if large scale RFID deployment is to be achieved in a 
cost effective manner.  
 It is clearly evident from the discussion that in today’s 
environment deployment of RFID systems is prone to security 
issues and data tampering is one key issue, which needs to be 
addressed immediately for secure and reliable deployment of 
this technology. Lukas Grunwald (2005) showed how 
vulnerable RFID tags can be, when he used a small program 
called RFDump to show, how the tags could be read, altered or 
even deleted using an inexpensive tag reader which can be 
plugged into a notebook [6, 8]. This small software showed 
how anyone could tamper the RFID data easily. In this paper 
we address the problem of data tampering in RFID tags, and 
present a solution based on the concepts of information hiding 
and fragile watermarking.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey 
the existing literature on RFID security. In Section 3, we 
formalize the problem description. In Section 4, we propose 
the tamper detection solution, termed as TamDetect. In Section 
5, we provide a discussion and conclude the paper in Section 6.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While researchers are just starting to address security 
questions, privacy advocates and legislators have for some 
time been attempting to address the privacy issues. A lot of 
work has been done to address the privacy issues in RFID 
deployment, however literature addressing the security issues 
is quite limited. The main aim of this section is to discuss the 
security issues in RFID systems and survey the relevant 
literature that is proposed to address the same. 
Wong and Raphael (2006) classify attacks on RFID systems 
into two categories – passive attacks and active attacks. 
Passive attackers are those who eavesdrop on the 
communications channel, but do not affect or interfere with the 
communication in any way [24]. Passive attacks compromise 
the confidentiality and anonymity in communication. Consider 
the warehouse management scenario, if a malicious reader can 
eavesdrop (spy) the communication between the tags and the 
readers, confidentiality and anonymity in such communication 
is lost because the entity involved in the communication is 
unaware when it is being attacked.  
Active attackers are those who directly interfere with the 
communication of messages, either by interrupting, fabricating 
or modifying communicated messages [24]. Active attacks 
compromise the availability, authenticity and integrity in 
communication. Interruptions refer to denial of service attacks 
(availability) on RFID tags. Engberg, Harning, and Jensen 
(2004), argued that if such an attack is launched, the RFID 
reader cannot query the tags which could have an adverse 
effect on a warehouse management system (or related 
applications) as it may stop responding and real-time status of 
the warehouse cannot be made available [4].   
Fabrication refers to attacks on the authenticity of the 
information on the RFID tag, such as tag forgery. RFID tags 
might be forged in order to get access to restricted locations 
within an organization.  
Modifications refer to attacks on the integrity of the 
information on the RFID tag (or system) such as data 
tampering. Data on the RFID tag could also be tampered with 
by malicious readers. Consider the warehouse scenario once 
again: if the data on the tag is tampered with, it could result in 
shipping wrong items from the warehouse. For instance, if the 
malicious reader changes the information on RFID tag from 
Orange to Apple, then a palette containing Apples might be 
shipped when the intention was to ship Oranges. Data 
tampering (or integrity) can raise issues like QoS (Quality of 
Service) and Trust in logistics and supply chain and hence 
needs to be addressed thoroughly.  
We now discuss the current literature which addresses some 
of the security issues highlighted in the Fig. 2. Most of the 
proposed solutions discussed here address the first four 
security properties i.e. confidentiality, availability, authenticity 
and anonymity. We begin the discussion with solutions to 
manage anonymity.  
 
A. Anonymity 
RFID technology shows the characteristics that can invade 
personal privacy; hence anonymity is highly desired if this 
technology would be deployed in mass scale. A lot of work has 
already been conducted in this area and several proposals are 
put forward to address the issue of privacy [9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. In this section, we discuss several 
approaches that can be used to provide consumer privacy.  
One of the simplest approaches to address the issue of 
privacy is to kill the tag once it leaves the supply chain and 
enters the consumer market. This approach is used by EPC 
standard which make the tags permanently inoperative. It is 
envisioned that the point-of-sale (POS) operator would have 
RFID reader that can send the command to kill the tag once it 
is sold to the consumer. However, to address the issue of 
malicious tag writes, the kill command is protected by a secret 
PIN which in this case is assumed to be with the POS RFID 
reader. Another approach is to add a RFID tag on the price tag. 
Hence, when the price tag is removed, the RFID is removed as 
 
 
Fig. 2 Major Security Issues with RFID Adoption 
2847
well and can guarantee privacy. However, as pointed out by 
Juels (2005), removing or killing the tags can restrict the post 
purchase benefits of RFID tags like receiptless item returns 
[11]. As a result, it would be useful if the tags could be 
temporarily deactivated. This could be achieved by access 
control mechanisms similar like using a PIN. Several other 








Using two tags – one for unique identification and other for 
product details. Does not address clandestine inventorying 




Re-encrypting the tag content using El-Gamal cryptosystem. 
The solution is presented in the context of securing RFID 





Blocker Tags: A tag that specifies whether it can be read or 
not. A privacy bit (0 or 1) is assigned on the tag which 
determines whether the tag can be publicly scanned (bit 0) 






This solution is based on using bilinear pairing in elliptic 
curve cryptography. Authenticity of the tag identifier is 
maintained by digitally signing the ciphertext with a trusted 
CA. This approach cannot address the issue of ciphertext 
swapping, i.e. when eavesdropper changes the content of 
two RFID tags simultaneously by swapping their content.  
Rakesh 
Kumar 
A Faraday cage is an enclosure designed to exclude 
electromagnetic fields. As a result, certain radio frequencies 
cannot penetrate through it. It can address privacy concerns, 
e.g. if high values currency notes start embedding a RFID 
tag, then using foil lined wallets can guarantee privacy 
 
B. Confidentiality 
Several approaches to access control are proposed in the 
literature. We will discuss a few of the approaches in greater 
detail in this section.  
Juels, Rivest and Szydlo (2003), discuss a hash based Access 
Control Protocol [13]. Here the tag is first in a locked state. 
When the tag moves to the unlocked state the reader can access 
the tags details. In order to change the state the tag first 
transmits Meta ID’ which is the hash value of a key. An 
authorized reader looks up the corresponding key in a backend 
system and sends it to the tag. The tag verifies the key by 
hashing it, returns the clear text ID, and remains only for a 
short time in an ‘unlocked’ state which provides time for 
reader authentication and offers a modest level of access 
security. 
C. Authenticity 
The literature on the authentication of the RFID tag is also 
very mature as of today. Several proposals are presented in the 
domain of tag authentication, reader authentication, and anti-
counterfeit tag.  Some of these approaches are outlined in 
Table 2. 
This concludes the survey of the most relevant literature on 
RFID security. We observed that most of the solutions 
addressed the issue of authentication, confidentiality and 
anonymity. Existing solutions do not address the issue of data 





Juels 2005 PIN: Authenticate the tag to the reader 
Juels 2004  Yoking Proofs – provides cryptographic proofs that two 
tags were scanned simultaneously and in physical 
proximity. Can be used in a pharmacy to prove to a 
government agency that the pharmacy scanned a RFID 
tagged medicine bottle and delivered the exact medicine 
as prescribed on the RFID tagged prescription  
Engberg et al. 
(2004)  
Zero-knowledge based protocols for communication 
between reader and tag so that they can authenticate 
each other without revealing any secrets that may allow 
them to be tracked. 
Molnar & 
Wagner, 2004  
Mutual authentication schemes using challenge-
response based on the use of pseudo-random function in 
the computation of responses to challenges.  
Feldhofer et 
al., 2004 
Proposes the Simple Authentication and Security Layer 




Provides forward secrecy by using nonces (random 
numbers that are never reused) by both the reader and 
tag in their challenges to each other. 
 
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
RFID tag carries data which represent unique item identifiers 
as well as product details to which it is attached. This data is 
very significant and if this is tampered with, it can have severe 
consequences. For example, if data representing the “nature of 
good” is changed, it can have severe implications. For instance, 
instead of Lethal Weapons the RFID could be tampered to 
represent that the consignment carries Oranges. Such data 
tampering needs to be detected as it can be a threat to national 
security.  
Data tampering of this nature can raise issues in 
collaborative environments where this data mismatch can 
result in repudiation issues. For example, in distributed 
logistics networks and extended enterprises, collaborating 
peers could accuse each other for being vulnerable to security 
attacks, which may reduce their trustworthiness. This shows 
the need to address the issue of data tampering.  
Normally, message authentication codes (MAC) are used for 
integrity check; however, in the RFID tag this is not possible 
(except the ISO 14443 standard) because of limited resources. 
Hence, checksums are often implemented to check the integrity 
of the information on these tags.  
In the previous section, we conducted an in-depth literature 
survey of RFID security solutions and we identified that no-
one has yet presented a solution to address the issues that we 
have highlighted here. This gives us the rationale to present our 
solution for tamper detection for data integrity management.  
 
IV. PROPOSED TAMPER DETECTION SCHEME - TAMDETECT  
In this section, we give a general overview of TamDetect 
solution. Based on the limitations of the security solutions 
outlined in Section 2 and 3, we then elicit the main 
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requirements for TamDetect, followed by the design rationale 
where we discuss the basic design decisions for TamDetect. 
 
A. General Overview of the TamDetect Solution 
 
TamDetect offers a fragile watermarking solution to address 
the issue of data tampering. The proposed solution can 
ascertain that data tampering has occurred and it can also 
identify the portion of the RFID tag that has been tampered 
with. To achieve this, TamDetect embeds a fragile watermark1 
in the serial number partition of the RFID tag. RFID tag data 
structure is composed of Header, EPC Manger (EM), Object 
Class (OC) and Serial Number (SN)2. This embedded 
watermark or secret pattern is used by the TamDetect 
component to identify data tampering. This is done in the 
following manner: suppose the secret pattern is generated using 
the data stored in EM and OC and then embedded in the SN 
partition. Now if the data on EM or OC is tampered with, it 
would introduce an inconsistency between the embedded 
pattern and the pattern that would be generated by the data 
from EM and/or OC. This inconsistency is detected by 
TamDetect and is used to identify data tampering. The detailed 
algorithm is explained later.  
The functionality for embedding of the secret pattern is 
assumed to be present in the RFID reader which initially writes 
the tags, whereas the detection algorithm is assumed to be 
available as a component which can be plugged in the RFID 
middleware applications. The TamDetect component which 
would be a part of the RFID middleware is shown in Fig. 3. 
This component takes input data from the data management 
layer, and then detects whether any data tampering has 
occurred. If data tampering has happened, then appropriate 
measures can be taken to prevent such data from entering the 
application integration levels in the middleware architecture. 
The most likely source of data tampering would be a malicious 
RFID reader who can access and modify the contents of the 
RFID tag over the entire wireless communication network. 
                                                        
1 A fragile watermark is a pattern which is hidden in a digital object, which 
is easily lost, if the object is tampered.  
2 The EM is used to identify manufacturer uniquely, whereas the OC is used 
to identify the product, manufactured by the manufacturer, finally the SN as 
the name suggests identified each unique item belonging to one product. 
 
In order to address the issues of data tampering, the 
following requirements are laid for the proposed TamDetect 
solution. 
1. Size of Fragile Watermark: The watermark hidden in the 
RFID tag should not occupy a lot of space because the 
amount of data that can be stored on the tag is very 
limited.  
2. Watermark Generation: The inputs for generating the 
watermark should be available on the tag itself.  
3. Embedding Locations: The fragile watermark should be 
embedded in the serial number partition.  
4. Tamper Detection: The algorithm should be able to detect 
that data tampering has occurred on the RFID tag. 
5. Localization of Tampering: The algorithms should be able 
to identify the portion on the RFID tag that has been 
tampered with, so that it can be rectified. 
6. Plug-n-Play Architecture: The proposed solution should 
be designed such that it can be easily plugged into the 
current RFID middleware applications.  
 
The theoretical foundation for TamDetect is proposed to 
satisfy the requirements outlined above. The following design 
decisions are proposed in this solution.  
 
1. The size of the watermark is limited to eight bits which 
represents 25% of the available redundant space on the 
RFID tag. (Req. 1) 
2. The watermark is a hash generated from the data stored in 
the EM and OC partitions. (Req. 2) 
3. The watermark is embedded in the serial number partition 
because it offers enough space (36 bits), which can be 
used for embedding the watermark. (Req. 3)  
4. A one-way hash function is used to generate an 8 bit string 
which is embedded in the serial number partition of the 
RFID tag. This hash value is checked to detect tampering. 
(Req. 4) 
5. The inputs to the hash function come from the OC and 
EM. Hence, if the hash is not matched, we can identify the 
section of the RFID tag that has been tampered with. (Req. 
5) 
6. The algorithm is designed as a component; hence, it can be 
easily plugged into any existing middleware application. 
(Req. 6) 
 
We now discuss the theoretical foundation for TamDetect. 
 
B. Theoretical Foundation for TamDetect  
The proposed framework is shown in Fig. 4, 5 and 6. It can 
be decomposed in four different stages:  
1. Watermark Generation 
2. Selecting the Embedding Location 
3. Watermark Embedding  
4. Tamper Detection 
 
 
Fig. 3 RFID Middleware Architecture with Tamper Detection Facility 
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Step 1: Watermark Generation 
 
Inputs EPC Manager (EM), or Object Class (OC), 
Hash Function f(.) 
Outputs Fragile Watermark (Wf) 
  
Generate Watermark 
The watermark is generated by using a pseudo random 
number generator (PRNG). The PRGN acts as a hash 
function in this case. The input for the hash function is the 
data that represents the EM or OC. EM or OC acts as a seed 
that generates a unique random number of a desired length. 
This unique number (in binary format) is used as a fragile 
watermark. This fragile watermark is then embedded in the 
serial number partition of the RFID tag. The process of 
generating the fragile watermark is shown in Fig. 4. The 28-
bit binary data from EM acts as a seed for the PRNG that 
generates an 8-bit random number which is used as a fragile 
watermark.  
Once the watermark has been generated, we have to identify 
the location for embedding. We now discuss how we select the 
appropriate location for embedding the watermark.  
Step 2: Selection the Embedding Location 
Previously we mentioned that the fragile watermark (Wf) is 
embedded in the serial number partition of the RFID tag. In 
this section, we give the reason for this selection.  
The basic principle of watermarking (or information hiding) 
is that we need some redundant space within the host signal 
which can be modified to embed the watermark.  In this case, 
the RFID tag is the host signal and we want to identify the 
redundant space. In order to do this, we investigated the RFID 
data structure. 
On the basis of that investigation, we determined that the 
serial number partition within the RFID tags can offer a 
reasonable amount of redundant space for embedding the 
fragile watermark. This selection is attributed to the following 
facts: 
The Header, is fully used for identifying the EAN.UCC key 
and the partitioning scheme. Hence, there is no redundant 
space, so there is no possibility for embedding the fragile 
watermark.  
The EPC Manager, is used to identify the manufacturer 
uniquely. Hence, this partition also does not offer any 
redundant space for embedding because it might be decided by 
the industry standard and the manufacturer has least control 
over this. 
The Object Class, is used to identify the product 
manufactured by the manufacturer. It may follow some product 
convention taxonomy where the first two digits might represent 
the classification of that product, the next two may be the age 
of product and so on. Hence, modifying any of this data might 
interfere with the existing industry standard. As a result, this 
partition also does not offer enough room for embedding the 
watermark. 
The Serial Number, which is the last partition, is used to 
uniquely identify an item which belongs to a particular Object 
Class. It is orthogonal to the first three partitions and can be 
decided by the manufacturer at will, without violating any 
existing industry standards.  Consequently, it offers enough 
redundant space to embed the watermark. Meanwhile, the 
length of this partition is 36 bits (in EPC96) which offers 
enough room to accommodate the fragile watermark. Thus, this 
becomes the most appropriate candidate for embedding the 
watermark, and hence, we decided to choose this partition to 
embed the watermark. We now discuss the embedding and 
extraction algorithm in detail.  
Step 3: Watermark Embedding Algorithm  
 
Inputs Serial Number (SN) 
Fragile Watermark (Wf)  
Embedding Location (L) 
Outputs Watermarked RFID Tag (W) 
  
Step 1: Access the Watermark 
In the first step, the RFID reader accesses the watermark. 
The watermark Wf may be generated by the RFID reader 
itself or by the RFID middleware. We assume that the 
reader has the functionality to generate the watermark  
Step 2: Select the embedding location within the serial 
number partition 
The SN partition has 36 bits; we select the first n+1 
(0<n<36) bits to embed the watermark, where n is the size 
of the fragile watermark. We express this location in the SN 
as L. The extra bit is used as a parity bit to check whether 
the watermark bits have changed after embedding.  
Step 3: Append Parity Bit 
In this step we append an even parity bit to the fragile 
watermark i.e. if the watermark is 8 bits long (11111111) 
then we append a 0 to make it 111111110.  
Step 4: Embedding the Watermark 
The 9 bits watermark is now embedded in the SN partition 
of the RFID tag. The process of embedding the watermark 
is shown in Fig. 5.  
 
Fig. 5a shows the generic model of how the embedding 
process occurs, whereas Fig. 5b shows an example of how an 
8-bit watermark (11111111) appended with a even parity bit 
(0) is embedded in the SN partition of the RFID tag. The 
fragile watermark is added to the first eight bits of the SN. It is 
shown as bold and underlined. The parity bit is shown next to 
it. So the final SN looks like 111111110. The advantage of 
 
Fig. 4 Process of Generating Fragile Watermark 
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having the watermark in the beginning is that it would be 
common to all the tags and would facilitate easy numbering. 
We now discuss the tamper detection algorithm.  
Step 4: Watermark Extraction & Tamper Detection Algorithm  
 
Inputs Serial Number (SN), Embedding Location (L), 
Hash Function f(.) 
Outputs Verification if the tag is tampered or not 
  
Step 1: Generate Watermark 
Generate the watermark (Wf~) once again using the PRNG 
f(.) and seed EM. Since EM is used as a seed in f(.) the 
resulting watermark Wf would be the same as it was when it 
was embedded, unless EM has been tampered with.  
Step 2: Extract the watermark from the serial number 
partition 
Extract the first 9 bits (Wfe) from the SN partition. Check 
for even parity. If even parity exists, then proceed to the 
next step. If not, then exit.  
Step 3: Tamper Detection 
In this step, compare the extracted watermark (Wfe) with the 
one generated in Step 1 (Wf~). Do the watermarks match? 
IF yes  NO Data Tampering observed 
IF no  Data on the RFID tag is tampered.  
 
 
The process of tamper detection is shown in Fig. 6. We 
show that the watermarked RFID tag has been attacked and the 
content of the EM has changed. When the tamper detection is 
performed, the data stored on EM is used to generate the 
watermark using the hash function f(.). Since the EM has 
changed, the watermark that is generated by f(.) would be 
different from the one that is embedded in the SN partition, and 
hence, tampering can be easily identified.  
If, however, the SN is tampered with, then it would be 
difficult to identify. In this case, we assume that the attacker 
has no incentive to change the SN. However, the mere fact that 
there is an inconsistency between the EM and SN indicates 
data tampering.  
 
V. DISCUSSION AND VALIDATION 
In this paper, we proposed a tamper detection solution to 
identify data tampering in RFID tags. The detection is achieved 
by embedding an 8-bit fragile watermark in the SN partition of 
the RFID tag. We showed how we can embed a fragile 
watermark that represents the EM, so if EM is tampered with, 
we can easily identify it. If we want to detect tampering of OC, 
the same approach can be further extended as well. However, 
the drawback would be reduced unique serial numbers. If we 
just use nine bits for embedding (i.e. EM only) we only 
consume 25% space and can uniquely identify 134,217,728 
items. If we use 18 bits to detect EM and OC, we use 50% 
space. Even with the remaining 18 bits we can still uniquely 
identify 262,144 items. This number is still acceptable if we 
consider palette level tracking. But at item level tagging, it 
might be unfeasible, in which case we can reduce the size of 
the watermark to 5 or 6 bits. However, if the size is too small it 
would reduce the security of the system. Hence, there is a 
 
Fig. 5  Process of Watermark Embedding 
 
 
Fig. 6  Process of Tamper Detection 
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tradeoff. But this is considered to be acceptable in a closed 
RFID system where the RFID tag data is shared amongst 
trading partners. 
The tamper detection technique that we presented is useful is 
identifying whether data tampering has happened and where 
the data has been tampered with. We would like to emphasize 
that this is not a tamper proof solution: we cannot protect the 
RFID tags from being tampered with. However, if the RFID 
tag is tampered with, we can prove that tampering has 
happened and at the same time we can show the data that has 
been tampered with.  
We assume that in a normal scenario, the most likely 
location where tampering would happen is the EM or the OC. 
This is because we assume that the main motivation behind 
tampering would to disguise one product as another (for e.g. 
cheaper shipping cost or other economic benefits) and this can 
be done only if the details with EM or OC are modified, but 
not the Serial Number. As a result, we embed the fragile 
watermark in the serial number, and hence, we can identify 
whether or not EM or OC have been tampered with.  
As long as the serial number has not been tampered with, the 
proposed technique can exactly indicate whether EM or OC 
has been modified. To achieve robustness against serial 
number tampering, the fragile watermark has to be embedded 
in some other read-write segment of the tag’s memory. The 
only issue with serial number tampering is that we cannot 
localize tampering, but we can still detect it.  
To improve the security of the system, we can provide an 
additional number of parity checks or we can perform error 
correction coding. However, the problem with this approach is 
limited space. Hence, we decided to have just one parity bit.  
We also assumed that the attacker has access in order to 
change the RFID tag; that is, either the tag is not write-
protected, or the access control is switched so it can be 
bypassed. We can also assume that an insider wants to change 
the RFID tag so that s/he can steal products from the premises. 
In this case, the access control can be intentionally deactivated 
for a while and the attack can be launched.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we proposed a tamper detection solution to 
address the issue of data tampering in the RFID tags. We found 
the majority of recent research work in RFID security has been 
done in the areas of anonymity, confidentiality and 
authenticity. Data integrity has not been tackled in detail. 
Hence, we propose a tamper detection solution by introducing 
a flexible layer into existing RFID middleware architecture. 
We also provided a detailed description of the tamper detection 
algorithm, which can detect and identify whether and what data 
(i.e. EM or OC) on the RFID tag has been tampered with.  
In the future we would like to enhance the embedding 
algorithm by using Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 
scheme. This would add more randomness to the embedded 




[1] Giuseppe Ateniese, Jan Camenisch, and Breno de Medeiros. Untraceable 
RFID tags via insubvertible encryption. November 2005. 
[2] Caspian: “Scandal: Wal-Mart, P&G involved in secret RFID 
testing,”Nov 10, 2003 
[3] Tassos Dimitriou. A Lightweight RFID Protocol to protect against 
Traceability and Cloning attacks, in Proceedings of the First International 
Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in 
Communications Networks (SECURECOMM’05). 
[4] Stephan Engberg, Morten Harning, and Christian Damsgaard Jensen. 
Zero knowledge device authentication: Privacy & security enhanced 
RFID preserving business value and consumer convenience. October 
2004. 
[5] Martin Feldhofer, Sandra Dominikus, and Johannes Wolkerstorfer. 
Strong authentication for RFID systems using the AES algorithm. 
3156:357–370, August 2004. 
[6] Lukas Grunwald, “RFDump Can Hack RFID Tags” , Available online: 
http://www.rfidgazette.org/2004/07/lukas_grunwalds.html Accessed on 
Sunday, 29 October 2006 
[7] Dirk Henrici and Paul M¨uller. Hash-based enhancement of location 
privacy for radio-frequency identification devices using varying 
identifiers. pages 149–153, March 2004. 
[8] G. V. Hulme, T. Claburn, “RFID's Security Challenge- Security and its 
high cost appears to be the next hurdle in the widespread adoption of 
RFID”, in InformationWeek, Nov. 15, 2004 URL: 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=526
01030  
[9] Sozo Inoue and Hiroto Yasuura. RFID privacy using user-controllable 
uniqueness. November 2003. 
[10] Ari Juels. “yoking-proofs” for RFID tags. pages 138–143, March 2004. 
[11] Ari Juels. RFID security and privacy: A research survey. Manuscript, 
September 2005. 
[12] Ari Juels and Ravikanth Pappu. Squealing euros: Privacy protection in 
RFID-enabled banknotes. 2742:103–121, January 2003. 
[13] Ari Juels, Ronald L. Rivest, and Michael Szydlo. The blocker tag: 
Selective blocking of RFID tags for consumer privacy. 8th ACM 
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 103–111, 
2003. 
[14] Heiko Knospe and Hartmut Pohl. RFID security. Information Security 
Technical Report, 9(4):39–50, November–December 2004. 
[15] Rakesh Kumar. Interaction of RFID technology and public policy, Wipro 
White Paper, November 2003. 
[16] Hennig, J. E., Ladkin, P. B., Siker, B., “Privacy Enhancing Technology 
Concepts for RFID Technology Scrutinized” 2005 
[17] David Molnar and David Wagner. Privacy and security in library RFID: 
Issues, practices, and architectures. pages 210–219, October 2004. 
[18] D. Molnar and D. Wagner, “Privacy and security in library RFID: Issues, 
practices, and architectures” In Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security – CCS, ACM Press, 2004 pp. 210-219 
[19] RFIDExchange http://www.rfidexchange.com/applications.aspx  
[20] Junichiro Saito, Jae-Cheol Ryou, and Kouichi Sakurai. Enhancing 
privacy of universal re-encryption scheme for RFID tags. 3207:879– 890, 
August 2004. 
[21] William Stallings. Cryptography and Network Security. Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1999.  
[22] Stephen Weis. Security and privacy in radio-frequency identification 
devices. Master thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
Massachusetts, USA, May 2003. 
[23] S. A. Weis, S. E. Sarma, R. L. Rivest, D. W. Engels, “Security and 
Privacy Aspects of Low-cost Radio Frequency Identification Systems”, 
in D. Hutter et al. Edn. Security in Pervasive Computing 2003, LNCS 
2802, pp. 201-212, 2004 
[24] Dennis M.-L. Wong and Raphael C.-W. Phan. RFID systems: 
Applications versus security & privacy implications, to be published by 
IDEA group, 2006.  
 
 
 
2852
